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                                                                           ABSTRACT      
              In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework combining both the theory of adoption and industry 
evolution to explore the different sources of industry efficiency growth. The objective is to investigate which of 
the explanatory variables can explain inefficiency. The theoretical and simulation results of this study show that 
the inter-firms efficiency variance exerts a substantial impact on industry efficiency.  Productivity change within 
individual plant (via adoption and learning) is a major source of efficiency growth in the industry. Exit usually 
improves aggregate efficiency as less efficient plants leave industries. The impact of entry is less clear since it 
depends on the efficiency levels of entrants. Finally, the role of competition in generating economic efficiency is 
strongly confirmed. Our theoretical findings confirm and extend others in the empirical studies. 
 
                                                                        INTRODUCTION  
 
             Significant differences in levels of efficiency and efficiency growth rates exist across industries, regions 
and countries. Technical efficiency arises when a firm makes the best use of its inputs and technologies. The 
study of efficiency is important, especially in the context of developing economies where firms and industries 
are far from the “best practice level” of efficiency given a level of technology. (Pitt and Lee (1981); Nishimuzu 
and Page (1982); Martin and Page (1983; Corbo and de Melo (1986); Chen and Tang 1987; Tybout (1991); 
Tybout and Westbrook (1995); Clerides at al (1998); Lundvall and Battese (2000) and others...). Tybout (2000), 
reports that in developing countries, the mean technical efficiency levels are around 60 to 70 per cent of the best 
practice frontier, in developing countries,. This is due to the high cross-firm variance in efficiency levels (Pack 
(1988), Blomstrom and Kokko (1998), etc…) Many other studies for sub-Saharan Africa argued that the 
problems of technical inefficiency are likely to be most important… 
 
Empirical studies explaining these differences in aggregate efficiency across industries and focusing on 
the contribution of different processes to industry efficiency growth have grown dramatically in recent years as 
plant-level, longitudinal databases have been developed (Baily et al 1992; Bartelsman and Drhymes 1992; Baily, 
Hulten and Campbell (1992), Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1994); Dwyer (1995, 1997); Bartelsman and Doms 
1997 ; Foster et al 1998; Jensen et al 1998). The evolution of aggregate industry efficiency is usually explained 
by three mechanisms:  
(a) Intra-plant factors (changes in productivity via adoption of innovation, learning, R&D…): these empirical 
studies have shown that technological changes lead to increased efficiency for the firm adopting it, but may also 
raise the distance  between the frontier and the average firms. This may result in a decline in average efficiency 
of the industry. Thus, the effect of technology on efficiency is ambiguous (see Caves 1992).  
(b) Inter-plant factors (the efficiency variance of plants and industry structure): the most significant finding of 
these studies is the large variance in efficiency levels between plants in the same industry as well as the 
persistence of this variance. These differences in efficiency have been shown to exert a substantial impact on 
industry efficiency. 
(c) Creative destruction factor via plant entry and exit: Empirical analysis of implications of turnover for 
efficiency dynamics has been recently provided by  Haltiwanger (1997) using plant-level manufacturing data 
from the U.S.; Aw, Chen and Roberts (1997) using firm-level data from Taiwan; Tybout (1996) and Liu and 
Tybout (1996) using data from Columbia, Chile, and Morocco; and Griliches and Regev (1995) using data from 
Israel and Baldwin (1995) using data from Canada.  These studies have shown that exit usually improves 
aggregate productivity as less efficient plants leave industries. The impact of entry is less clear since it depends 
on whether efficiency level of entrants is higher or lower than the average efficiency of the industry.  
 
Other studies (Caves (1992)) have classified the determinants explaining inter-industry differences in efficiency 
into four intra-industry factors. These four factors are: 
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 (a) Competitive conditions (including factors related to market structure such as concentration of the industry, 
import competition and export intensity). 
(b) Structural heterogeneity (those that cause competing units to exhibit heterogeneous levels of efficiency in the 
long run and include capital intensity, product differentiation, consumer preference and demand elasticity, and 
diversity of plant scale). 
 (c) Dynamic disturbances (technology adoption, learning and intensity of R&D expenditure). 
(d) Regulation: Among the regulatory policies affecting efficiency are tariff protection and policies that control 
the entry of firms in an industry. High entry costs and market interventions like artificial entry barriers not only 
reduce the amount of entry but also encourage incumbents with lower efficiency to remain in the market. This 
increases the efficiency dispersion in the market, reducing the average level of efficiency.  Foster et al (1998), 
show that the relative size of these components of the industry efficiency change, a finding that depends rather 
heavily on the method used to decompose aggregate efficiency as well as on the time period examined.  
 
 Theoretical attempts to explain the contribution of these different processes to industry efficiency 
growth are much scarcer than empirical studies. They typically focus on industry structure, initial levels of 
efficiency, the quality of inputs to production and also on some measure of technical change (Beeson 1987; 
Fogarty and Garofalo 1988; Williams and Moomaw 1989 and 1991). These studies assume that efficiency 
change results from identical, perfectly competitive firms responding homogeneously to economic forces of 
various kinds. This often makes aggregate models inconsistent with observed behaviour at the plant level and 
obscures the individual process and different mechanisms that generate industrial efficiency change.  Though, 
many theoretical fields, where imperfect competition and firm heterogeneity are the norm, focus on these factors 
separately, like the theory of innovation and adoption for intra-plant factors (Feder [1980], Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1985), Feder, Just and Silberman [1984], Jensen (1992), Hoppe (2000) and others),  the theory of industrial 
organization for inter-plants factors (Dunne et al 1989; Dom 1993; Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman 1994; Baldwin 
1995; Doms et al 1995; Caves 1997, Nelson and Winter 1982; Metcalfe 1992), and the theory of industry 
evolution and creative destruction for entry and exit Lippman and Rumelt (1982), Gort and Klepper (1982), 
Dixit and Shapiro (1986), Jovanovic and Lach (1989), Ericson and Pakes (1989, 1990), Lambson (1991,1992), 
Hopenhayen (1992) D.B.Audretsch et Talat Mahmood (1994) and others).  
Based on these considerations, the aim of this paper is to identify and sort out the role of different 
factors that affect the efficiency of firms, the average efficiency of the industry and to determine the nature and 
magnitude of the contribution of each factor to aggregate efficiency growth. In order to do that, we use a model 
of plant-level heterogeneity, in which we combine the theory of adoption, industrial evolution and creative 
destruction. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. In Section 2, industry equilibrium is 
defined, while Section 3 provides the analysis of the model. Section 3 is divided into three parts, with the first 
focusing on structure, the second developing comparative statistics. Section 5 provides final remarks.      
 
1- The Model: 
 
In this section we present a dynamic model of adoption and passive learning in which we explicitly formalize the 
firms’ entry and exit decisions in a market for a differentiated product with monopolistic competition. Our model 
is similar to Hopenhayen (1992, 1993) and Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) in that firms are faced with 
individual efficiency shocks, which is the only source of uncertainty. On the basis of these shocks, firms decide 
when to optimally exit the industry. The process of market selection then leads to exit of firms afflicted by 
unfavourable shocks, often opening up room for entrants. A central feature of the model is that an entrant does 
not know its own cost structure. Rather, relative efficiency of each entrant is discovered through the process of 
learning from actual market experience. Entrants who discover that their efficiency level exceeds their 
expectations will expand the scale of their business, whereas those discovering that their post-entry performance 
is less than commensurate with their expectations will exit from the industry. Entry requires an investment that is 
non-recoverable and becomes a sunk cost thereafter.  
Each firm produces a unique brand of the same generic product. Hence, at any given time t, the number 
of firms operating, n(t), equals the number of varieties available to consumers. We assume a Dixit and Stiglitz 
utility function:  
 tdtCtxeU tr ))(log)(( 0
0
+= 
∞
−
                                                                                                         (1) 
Where )(0 tx  is the consumption of the numeraire in time t, and )( tC  is the consumption index of the Dixit-
Stiglitz type 
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 Where )( ty j  is the amount of variety j of the differentiated product demanded by a consumer at time t.  The 
aggregate demand function  )( tY j for variety j at time t  is: 
            E
idtp
tp
tY
tn
i
j
j

−
−
= )(
0
)1(/
)1(/1
)(
)(
)(
αα
α
                                                                                                         (3) 
where E is equal to the total instantaneous expenditure on the differentiated product and )( jp j is the price of 
variety j at time t. The demand function (3) is isoelastic with the elasticity of demand )1(/1 ασ −= .    
Efficiency is obtained by minimizing the cost incurred at each level of activity. The technology used by the firm 
is described by the cost function FtytctC j
x
j
x
j += )()(ˆ)( , where F is the fixed cost and )(ˆ tc xj  is 
the marginal cost. Across firms, xcˆ ’s are random and take three possible values )(ˆ tc oj , )(ˆ tc lj and hcˆ , with 
)(ˆ)(ˆˆ tctcc ojljh << . Firms experiencing )(ˆ tc oj are the lowest-efficiency (o-) firms, which still use the old 
technology. Those experiencing hcˆ  are the high-efficiency (h-) firms which have adopted the new technology 
and use it at the “best practice” level of technical efficiency for which it was designed. Finally, l-firms 
experiencing )(ˆ tc lj  have adopted the new technology but are still engaged in learning, adaptation and search 
efforts in order to have successful implementation and to use the new technology efficiently.  
 
 
    It is assumed that firms discover their type at the beginning of each period. A firm j of type x ( x = o, l, h) 
which stays maximizes profits tj
x
jjj
x
j Ftytctytpt −−= )()(ˆ)()()(pi , subject to the demand 
curve it faces given in (3). The optimal pricing rules for firm j of type x is:   
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 Using this pricing rule, the profit expression of the firm j of type x is: 
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Let tcm is the cross firms average efficiency level during the period t. tcm is the most commonly reported 
summary measure of industry’s performance. =
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Let ltcm , 
o
tcm  and ch  be respectively the average efficiencies of  (l-) and o-firms in this period. 
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The aggregate efficiency “cm” can be calculated as the weighted average of efficiency levels for (o-), (l-) and h-
firms.  tncmtncmtncmc oot
ll
t
hh
t ++=  
 
We assume that t
x
j cmtjAtc  = , with 0≥ tjA  for all j, is a continuous and monotonously 
decreasing function of the firm index j. That is, firms are ranked in terms of this parameter in such a way that 
more efficient firms have a lower index number. We assume a specific functional form for ),( tjA  , namely:    
 
             2)(0)(2
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tn
j
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 Where )( tε is an endogenous parameter measuring the industry concentration. We can see that higher values of 
this parameter imply a greater inter-firm variance in efficiency. As )( tε  converges to zero the industry 
becomes homogenous and ),( tjA converges to 1. 
Finally we can see that in the expression t
x
j cmtjAtc ),()( = the type of the firm does not matter. To make 
difference between (l-) and o-firms (which is necessary to avoid undetermined form and to solve the model) we 
assume that )(),(.)( tcmtjAltc tlj =  and )(),(.)( tcmtjAotc toj = .  l and o are two different positive 
values very close to 1. (l > o). This hypothesis does not affect results since l and o are instrumental variables 
which will disappear by simplification).  
 
The expressions of the (h-), (l-) and o-firms profits can be written as follow: 
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1-4- The adoption decision: 
    A firm aj maximizes the discounted value of total profits by choosing the adoption date T.  Denoting the 
total profit function as )(TjaΠ  the optimization problem of this firm is as follow: 
)()()()()(
0
TXaetdtetdtetdteT Tr
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htr
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l
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tr
T
o
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−
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−
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2-5- The firms entry decision 
An entrant elj , using the new technology, maximizes the discounted value of total profits by choosing the 
entry date elT .  Denoting the profit function as )( elj TelΠ  the optimization problem of this entrant is as 
follows:    
)()()()(
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2-9- The firms exit decision: 
 
The exit decision is made prior to observing the next period’s efficiency level and will involve a reservation 
rule:  
     
 
ol
j
o
jj
l
j
l
jj
Stctvthtctvth =++−+++   11111                                               (9)  
where  th j  is the probability of adopting of the new technology. A firm using the old technology will exit 
the industry the first time its rank rises above this reservation value jˆ . 
 
2-10- Industry dynamics: 
 
             The composition of firms evolves in accordance with average probabilities of adoption h(t) (of o-firms), 
of technical success (l-firms) and of entry and exit (o, l and h-firms). Let )( tn a  be the number of o-firms 
which adopt the new technology in period t, then 
 
)(.)()( tnthtn oa =                                                                                                                                       (10) 
The number of o-firms, )( ton , evolves according to: 
 
)()()()()1( tsntnetntntn ooaoo −+−=+                                                                                       (11)  
)(tsn o  is the number of exit among non innovating firms of type o, at the end of period t (or at the beginning of 
period t+1). )( ten o  is the number of firms which enter the industry at the end of period t, using the old 
technology. Let )( ten l the number of innovating entrants of type l and )( tns l the number of exits among l-
firms. The total number of l-firms in period t+1 is: 
 
)()()()())(1()1( tnstentntnttn ilall −++−=+ ρ                                                            (12) 
The number of h-firms evolves according to:  
 
)()()()1( tnttntn lhh ρ+=+                                                                                                              (13) 
 
where )( tρ is the average probability of success of l-firms. Thus  tnt lρ  is the number of l-firms, which 
have achieved, with success, their adoption and learning process and become high-efficiency firms. 
Finally, the total number of firms operating in the industry in period t, )( tn , is: 
 
 )()()()( tntntntn olh ++=                                                                                                             (14) 
     This total number evolves in according to: 
                               
 )()()()1( tsntentntn −+=+                                                                                                                   (15) 
where )( tsn is the total number of exits at the end of period t (or at the beginning of period t+1):   
)()()()( tsntnstnstsn olh ++=
                                                                                                     (16) 
)( ten is the total number of entry at the end of period t (or at the beginning of period t+1 ): 
)()()( tnetnetne ol +=                                                                                                                                (17) 
 
                                                               FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
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Figures 1, 2-a, 2-b, 2-c and 3 present simulations of the endogenous variables* for different values 
given to the concentration degreeε , with 0 < ε < 2. Before studying the contribution of these variables to 
industry efficiency growth, we begin by focusing on the effect of inter-firm efficiency variance on these 
technology, entry, exit and structure variables.   
------------------------------------------------------- 
*Further details on the resolution of the model may be obtained by contacting the author: 
Asma.Raies@malix.univ-paris1.f  
 
Figure 2-a shows that inter-firm efficiency variance seems to inhibit entry, especially for non innovative 
o-firms (Acs and Audretsch, 1991). It shows that entry rate is high for low values of ε <0.5. The traditional 
industrial organization literature often implicitly assumed that there is insufficient entry in an imperfectly 
competitive market. By contrast, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) established a tendency toward excessive entry. 
We show that excessive entry is possible in an imperfectly competitive market when inter-firm variance in 
efficiency is low. However, mortality rates also tend to be high, resulting in high turbulence (Figure 2-b). Net 
entry, however, is much smaller than gross entry. This result confirms Beesly and Hamilton (1984) and Acs and 
Audretsch (1990, 1992), who show that most entrants are new, small firms that are far below any measure of 
minimum efficiency scale. In general, a large percentage of the entrants exit the industry within a few years after 
entry. 
Comparing figures 2-a and  2-b, we can see the positive relationship between entry and exit for 0< ε <1.5. More 
recent empirical studies on industry dynamics indicate high rates of turnover in terms of entry as well as exit of 
firms in many countries. Dunne et al. (1988), Dune and Roberts (1991) and Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) show 
that not only do entry and exit occur simultaneously but, very interestingly, they are positively correlated across 
industries at one point in time as well as over time within an industry. 
Finally, comparing figures 1, 2-a and 2-b, we find that there is no absolutely monotonic relationship  between 
entry and adoption, which means that high rates of innovation do not necessarily deter entry. However, the 
numbers of exit of (o-) and l –firms are positively correlated, respectively, with the average probabilities of 
adoption h and technical success ρ . This means that the probability of survival appears in sectors characterized 
by high rates of innovation  
 The results obtained from figure 3 show that less efficient o-firms achieve lower average efficiency than 
do (l-) and h-firms for each level of industry concentration and that the efficiency level of these firms is strictly 
decreasing in the concentration degree. We can see that efficiency growth for an industry as a whole, cm 
depends, to an important degree, on the distribution of efficiency among firms ε   and not only on the firms’ 
individual productivities. These results confirm those of the empirical work of Richard E Caves (1998). 
There is no monotonic relationship between the average efficiency of the industry (cm) and the 
concentration degreeε . The effect of concentration is positive for moderate (0.5 <ε < 1) and very high values 
(1.5 <ε < 2) of this parameter, while it is negative for low (0 <ε < 0.4) and high values (1 < ε < 1.5). For this 
reason, we distinguish between these four intervals when analyzing the effect of inter-firm efficiency variance on 
the industry efficiency. 
 
§- Low concentration (0 < ε < 0.4): 
 
Technological effects: Figure 1 shows that in this interval, inter-firm efficiency variance does not affect the 
adoption rate, so the adoption effect on industry average efficiency is zero. In the same figure, parameter ρ  
seems to be very high (close to 1). This means that when inter-firm efficiency variance ε is very low, the 
average efficiency of l-firms is sufficiently close to that of high-efficiency firms (which is the best practice level 
ch). Thus, the likelihood of reaching this best practice level is very high for l-firms. However, we can see that 
this parameter decreases slowly in ε in this interval, which induces a negative learning effect on the industry 
average efficiency.   
Entry effect: Figure 2-a shows that entry effect of less efficient o-firms is nil since neo = 0 for 0 <ε < 0.4. The 
entry of innovative firms in this interval is excessive (see previous paragraph), but it is decreasing in this 
parameter which yields a negative entry effect on average efficiency growth.  
Exit or selection effect: Figure 2-b indicates that concentration increases the exit number of less efficient o-firms 
(nso) which improves industry average efficiency (cm). However, concentration decreases the number of exiting 
l-firms, which has a negative effect on total efficiency. In this case, the net selection effect on the industry is 
ambiguous.  
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Structure effect: Figure 2-c shows that the total number of active firms (n) rises in inter-firm efficiency variance 
in the interval of [0 , 0.4]. This is due to an increase in the number of innovator firms (n l) and (n h) is also 
associated with a decrease in the less efficient o-firms (n o).  This implies a positive structure effect on aggregate 
efficiency (c m). To sum up these results, we suggest that both negative learning and entry effects dominate the 
positive structure effect and thus provide a decrease in industry average efficiency (cm) in the degree of 
concentration for [ ]400 ∈ε  . 
 
 
§- Moderate concentration (0,5 < ε < 1): 
 
Technological effects: The adoption rate is increasing in the interval [ ]150  , yielding a positive adoption effect 
on average efficiency. However, the average probability of technical success is decreasing, which implies a 
negative learning effect on industry efficiency. 
Entry effect is negative since entry of innovator l-firms (nei) is decreasing in ε  and (neo=0). 
Exit or selection effect is positive since the number of firms exiting is higher for less efficient o-firms (nso) than 
innovative l-firms (nsl). 
Structure effect is positive because the number of less efficient o-firms (no) remains lower than (nl) and (nh) in 
this interval. 
We conclude from figure 3 that learning and entry effects are dominated by adoption, selection and structure 
effects, which induce a positive net effect on industry average efficiency (cm). 
 
§- High concentration (1 < ε < 1.5) : 
 
Technological effects: Both the adoption and learning effects have a negative effect on efficiency since the 
respective parameters h and ρ  are decreasing in ε (figure 1). 
Entry effect is nil since nei = neo = 0 (fig 2-a). 
Exit or selection effect is negative since ε lowers the exit number of less efficient firms (nso). The high survival 
rate of inefficient firms can be explained by the absence of entry of both low- and high-efficiency firms. We 
conclude that even if there is no direct effect of entry on efficiency, firm births and deaths are important 
contributions of competition to economic efficiency. Thus, market competition from new entrants indirectly 
raises firm efficiency in the industry (via selection effects).  
Structure effect: One insight that emerges from figure 2-c is the persistence of less efficient o-firms for 
1<ε <1.5. We can see that even the efficiency gap between high efficiency h-firms and low efficiency o-firms 
is large. However, we observe a significant persistence of less efficient o-firms. This persistence is due to low 
exit rates of firms in this interval. The existence of these inefficient firms that are suboptimal within the 
organization of an industry represents a loss in economic efficiency (Leonard Weiss 1991). We deduce the 
strong negative structure effect on aggregate efficiency. 
As all effects are negative, the industry average efficiency decreases in [ ]511 ∈ε  
§- Very high concentration (1,5 < ε < 2) : 
 
Technological effects: Both the adoption and learning effects have a positive effect on efficiency. Indeed, the 
respective parameters h and ρ  are very high and increasing in ε (figure 1). 
Entry effect is nil since nei = neo = 0 (fig 2-a). 
Exit or selection effect is strongly positive on efficiency. In facts the inter-firms efficiency variance is too high to 
produce a very excessive exit even for innovative (l-) and h-firms. The exit number of o-firms nso is very low 
because the majority of these firms has adopted the innovation and thus becomes of type l (fig 1) and there is no 
entry of o-firms (fig 2-a).  
Structure effect: The strong selection effect seems to affect industry structure which tends to the monopolistic 
situation when ε tends to its maximal level. (We can see in table 1 that n = nh = 1 for 2=ε  . This implies 
that the industry average efficiency tends toward the maximum level of efficiency ch. Thus the Structure effect is 
positive in this interval. 
As all effects are positive, the industry average efficiency increases in [ ]251 ∈ε  
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        An important conclusion of this sensitivity analysis is that the weight of each effect on aggregate change in 
efficiency is sensitive to the concentration level of the industry which we suppose exogenous in this paper. To 
sum up the results from this sensitivity analysis, we regroup these different effects in the subsequent table. We 
attribute the number 2 when the effect is dominant and explains the growth in efficiency, the number 1 for nil 
effects and 0 when effect is non dominant. The total gives the average explicative power of each effect. 
 
 
 
 
          Levels of  
               Concentration 
  efficiency  
      effects                              
 
   Low       moderate        high         very high    Total 
 
Adoption effect 
Learning effect 
Entry  effect 
Exit  effect 
Structure effect 
 
    1                2                    2                 2                7 
    2                0                    2                 2                6 
    2                0                    1                 1                4 
    1                2                    2                 2                7 
    0                2                    2                 2                6 
 
 
         The table suggests that adoption and selection effects play the more significant role in the changes in 
efficiency at the industry level. This means that the important sources of efficiency growth in the industry, over 
the four intervals, are the adoption of innovation by incumbents and the exit of very low efficiency plants. 
Learning and structure effects exerted the second most important influence on gains in industry efficiency. 
Finally the impact of firms entry didn’t have a strong effect on average efficiency. These results accord with 
many empirical studies. For examle David L.Rigby and Jürgen Essletzbichler (1999) show that technological 
changes by incumbent plants outweighs the impacts of other influences on productivity and generate 
approximately 64% of the overall change in average productivity and that plant exit exerted the second most 
important influence on gains in industry efficiency. Finally the impact of plant entry didn’t have a clear and 
significant effect on average efficiency 
 
                                        LIMITATION OF THE STUDIES AND FUTURE STUDIES 
 
The framework developed in this paper formalizes a passive learning process and not firms’ R&D behaviour, but 
seems to be flexible to include it. In order to investigate the effect of factors in explaining efficiency we have 
used, the simulations of the model in static contexts. In the future researches, these effects will be discussed in a 
dynamic context. 
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Figure 1: The effect of efficiency variance 
on adoption and technical success 
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Figure 2-a: Effect of concentration 
on entry
0
50
100
150
200
0,15 0,4 0,7 1 1,3 1,6 1,9
concentration degree
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f e
n
tr
y
ne (t) nei (t)
neo(t)
Figure 2-b: Effect of concentration on 
exit
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Figure 2-c: Effect of concentration on industry 
structure  
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Figure 3: The effect of concentration degree on the average 
efficiencies 
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      Concentration  
                       
degree ε  
Equilibruim 
 values 
 
Low concentration 
 0.1    0.2     0.3      0.4 
 
Moderate concentration 
0.5    0.6    0.7    0.8    0.9    1 
 
High. Concentration  
 1.1   1.2    1.3   1..4    1.5 
 
Very High concentration 
  1..6     1.7    1.8    1..9      2 
 
Technological 
variables 
h 
ρ  
Entry  variables 
n e 
n e o 
n e l 
Exit  variables 
 n s 
n s o 
n s i 
Structure 
variables 
n 
n o 
n l 
n h 
Efficiency 
variables 
cmo 
cml 
ch 
cm 
 
 
0.55   0.5 5   0.55  0.55 
0.99  0.99    0.97    0.97 
--------------------------- 
400   250     166      118 
0         0        12        18    
400   250     154      100 
---------------------------- 
137   100      62        54 
0        10       24         35 
137    90       38          19 
---------------------------- 
100   362     250      203 
70       31       21        18 
20     262     160      116 
10      69       69        69 
----------------------------- 
0.31   0.3    0.29      0.28 
0.45   0.45   0.43    0.43 
0.48   0.48   0.48     0.48 
0.44   0.44   0.43     0.43 
 
 
 
0.56  0.57  0.58  0.59  0.6  0.61 
0.96  0.94  0.92   0.9   0.9  0.86 
------------------------------------- 
87     59     33     20      13      1 
12     19     13      8       5        1 
75     40     20     12      8       0 
------------------------------------- 
48     47     4      37      34     28 
28     36     31    27      24     21 
20    11     12     10      10     10   
------------------------------------- 
163  138  111    89      82      78 
15     13    11      9        8        7 
79     56     30    10       4        1 
69     70     70    70       70     70 
-------------------------------------  
0.27  0.27  0.26  0.26 0.26 0.25 
0.42 0.42  0.42  0.41  0.41 0.41 
0.48 0.48  0.48  0.48  0.48 0.48 
0.43 0.44  0.45  0.45  0.46 0.46 
 
 
 
0.61   0.6   0.57   0.51 0.5 
0.85   0.83   0.8   0.75 0.7 
------------------------------- 
0        0        0        0       0 
0        0         0        0      0 
0        0         0        0      0 
------------------------------- 
20     10        1        0      0 
20     10        1        0      0 
0        0         0        0      0 
------------------------------- 
72     79     89      98   100 
6        8      20      33     35 
0        2       3        4        6 
66     69     66       61    59 
------------------------------- 
0.25  0.24 0.24  0.23 0.23 
0.4   0.39  0.39   0.4  0.42 
0.48 0.48  0.48  0.48 0.48 
0.45  0.42 0.39  0.39 0.39 
 
 
 
0.54    0.89  0.92  0.95  0.98 
0.98    0.85  0.80  0.90   0.97 
----------------------------------- 
0         0          0         0         0 
0         0          0         0         0 
0         0          0         0         0 
-------------------------------- 
88      92       100     100   100 
8        4           3         1        0 
80      88        97       99    100 
---------------------------------- 
97      11         7          1        1 
32       0          0          0        0 
4         0          0          0        0 
61      11         7          1        1 
----------------------------------- 
0.22  0.22     0.21    0.21   0.2 
0.44   0.45    0.47    0.47 0.48 
0.48   0.48    0.48    0.48 0.48 
0.48   0.48    0.48    0.48 0.48 
 
Table 1: Equilibrium value of endogenous variables for different levels of concentration degree ε  
